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This paper examines the phenomenon of non-consensual condom removal
(NCCR) and its relationship to sexual assault in Canada. Using empirical studies
and the insights of feminist theory, we explore the nature of the harms caused by
NCCR and contend that this pervasive practice constitutes sexual assault. We then
critique the decision of R v Hutchinson, which held that condom sabotage does
not negate subjective consent, ignoring the dignitary harms of NCCR. While lower
court decisions before Hutchinson recognized that consent to sex with a condom
does not include consent to sex without, courts after Hutchinson have struggled
to distinguish the decision in ways that lack coherence or have simply ignored
the decision altogether. After briefly examining legislative amendments in other
jurisdictions, we argue for a return to the fundamental finding in R v Ewanchuk that
how sexual activity is carried out, including whether a condom is used, must be
part of the subjective consent inquiry.

Dans cet article, nous examinons le phénomène du retrait non consensuel du
condom (RNC) et son lien avec les agressions sexuelles au Canada. À l’aide
d’études empiriques et de la théorie féministe, nous explorons la nature des
préjudices causés par le retrait non consensuel du condom et soutenons que cette
pratique omniprésente constitue une agression sexuelle. Nous critiquons ensuite
la décision rendue dans l’affaire R. c. Hutchinson, selon laquelle le sabotage du
préservatif n’annule pas le consentement subjectif, ignorant ainsi les atteintes à
la dignité causées par le RNC. Alors que les décisions des tribunaux inférieurs
rendues avant l’arrêt Hutchinson reconnaissaient que le consentement à des
relations sexuelles avec un préservatif n’inclut pas le consentement à des relations
sexuelles sans préservatif, les tribunaux après l’arrêt Hutchinson se sont efforcés
de distinguer la décision de manière peu cohérente ou ont tout simplement
ignoré la décision. Après avoir examiné brièvement les modifications législatives
apportées dans d’autres juridictions, nous plaidons en faveur d’un retour à la
conclusion fondamentale de l’arrêt R c. Ewanchuk selon laquelle la façon dont
l’activité sexuelle est menée, y compris l’utilisation d’un préservatif, doit faire partie
de l’enquête sur le consentement subjectif.
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“It is true that dignitary harms, because nonmaterial, are ephemeral to the legal mind.”1

Introduction
Non-consensual condom removal (NCCR)—the removal of a condom
before or during sexual intercourse without one’s partner’s consent—is
located at the intersections of sexual autonomy, sexual consent, and sexual
violence.2 NCCR can occur either through deception, when a sexual
partner is tricked into believing her partner is wearing a condom, through
condom tampering, or through outright refusal to wear a condom despite a
partner’s expressed wishes. NCCR is a pervasive practice that undermines
women’s reproductive rights, sexual agency, and equality.3

1.
Catharine A MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 1st ed (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1989) at 173.
2.
See generally Sumayya Ebrahim, “I’m Not Sure This Is Rape, But: An Exposition of the
Stealthing Trend” (2019) 9:2 SAGE Open 1; Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape-adjacent: Imagining Legal
Responses to Non-consensual Condom Removal” (2017) 32:2 Colum J Gender & L 183.
3.
See Konrad Czechowski et al, “‘That’s Not What Was Originally Agreed To’: Perceptions,
Outcomes, and Legal Contextualization of Non-consensual Condom Removal in a Canadian Sample”
(2019) 14:7 PloS One 1 at 21. While we recognize that not only women experience NCCR, this article
uses gendered language to reflect the reality that all the complainants in the case law are women and
all the accused are men, highlighting the gendered nature of this practice.
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The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Hutchinson4 held that condom
deception could constitute fraud under section 265(3)(c) vitiating an
otherwise valid consent but only where there was a significant risk of
serious bodily harm to the complainant. The accused in Hutchinson had
poked holes in condoms in order to impregnate his sexual partner against
her wishes.5 The majority decision in Hutchinson is about the definition
of “the sexual activity in question” under section 273.1 of the Criminal
Code:6 that is, about exactly what one consents to in consenting to sex.7
While upholding the accused’s conviction for sexual assault, the majority
decision constructed condom use as “collateral” to the consent inquiry,8
determining that where NCCR involves deception, it can be criminalized
through fraud vitiating an otherwise valid consent.
It is important to distinguish between factors that negate consent
directly and factors that only vitiate an otherwise valid consent. By
including condom deception within the doctrine of fraud vitiating consent,
the Court maintained that condom use does not go to the definition of
consent itself but simply vitiates it for public policy reasons. This
distinction between negating consent and vitiation is important because
where there is no deception or no significant risk of serious bodily harm,
both required to establish fraud vitiating consent, there will be no path to
establishing sexual assault. Instead, the complainant is told she consented
to sexual activity she never agreed to participate in. As we demonstrate,
a large majority of reported cases involve condom refusal, not condom
deception, thus ruling out the fraud path to conviction. R v Kirkpatrick,9 a
case involving condom refusal was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada
in November 2021. Interveners and the Crown asked the Court to retreat
from its position in Hutchinson that condom use is collateral to consent.10
In this paper, we argue that NCCR, whether deceptive or overt,
must be understood as directly negating subjective consent to sexual
intercourse. Any other approach ignores both the non-physical, dignitary
harms of NCCR, and the degree to which it perpetuates the objectification
4.
2014 SCC 19 [Hutchinson SCC].
5. See ibid at para 2.
6.
RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].
7. See supra note 4 at paras 14-15.
8.
Ibid at paras 27-28.
9.
SCC File No 39287.
10. See e.g. SCC File No 39287 (Factum of the Intervener, Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic)
at para 3, online (pdf): <scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/39287/FM090_Intervener_
Barbra-Schlifer-Commemorative-Clinic.pdf>. This was also the position taken in Lise Gotell &
Isabel Grant, “Does ‘No, Not Without a Condom’ Mean ‘Yes, Even Without a Condom’?: The Fallout
from R v Hutchinson” (2020) 43:2 Dal LJ 767, commenting on R v Kirkpatrick, 2020 BCCA 136
[Kirkpatrick].
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and substantive inequality of women. Our case law analysis reveals that
prior to Hutchinson, courts took this approach and understood NCCR
as negating consent. Since Hutchinson, however, the case law has
been contradictory—some courts squeeze NCCR into the sexual fraud
framework, while others struggle to differentiate Hutchinson, and still
others ignore the decision altogether. By narrowly constructing the harm
of NCCR as its “physical” or “bodily” consequences, the Hutchinson
majority approach inhibits legal recognition of how NCCR is experienced
as harmful and degrading because it transgresses the limits of consent
to the sexual activity in question. Agreeing to sex with a condom is a
specific form of sexual activity and consenting to protected sex should
never be viewed as implying agreement to unprotected penetration. As
we emphasize, whether a condom is used is a vital part of how the sexual
activity is carried out, and insistence on condom use is a mechanism for
setting limits on the degree of intimacy of a sexual encounter.
In the first section of this paper, we respond to recent claims in the
literature that NCCR is nothing more than a media-generated moral panic.
Using empirical studies and the insights of feminist theory, we explore
the harms caused by NCCR and contend that this pervasive practice
demands legal regulation. As we emphasize, the transgression of sexual
boundaries becomes eroticized through NCCR, survivors are objectified
and degraded, and this in turn reinforces systemic inequality. We then
set out the legal landscape on consent and interrogate the Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Hutchinson. We discuss why the majority,
influenced by case law on HIV nondisclosure, might have taken such a
narrow approach. Next, we examine cases decided both before and after
Hutchinson in which complainants consented to sexual penetration with
a condom, but not without, in order to illustrate the confusing legacy left
by the Hutchinson decision. Many of these cases demonstrate the abuse
of power inherent in removing a condom against the wishes of a sexual
partner. While most judges appear to intuitively recognize the criminality
in NCCR, some struggle with the doctrinal distinctions left by Hutchinson
that suggest that only deceptive forms of condom removal that raise a
significant risk of serious bodily harm will constitute sexual assault.
Finally, we conclude with some thoughts on law reform and on how, as
feminist legal scholars committed to substantive equality, we need to take
up the challenge of forging a more principled basis for defining the scope
of consent to sexual activity in a manner that includes how the sexual
activity is carried out.11
11.

This paper does not address other birth-control deceptions that are not directly part of how the
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I.

Non-consensual condom removal: Undermining of women’s sexual
agency
The issue of NCCR entered popular culture with the publication of
Alexandra Brodsky’s widely cited 2017 article on “stealthing” in which
she considered legal responses to deceptive condom removal during
intercourse.12 Brodsky’s interrogation of stealthing as a consent violation
and as an expression of gender-based violence has generated intense
scholarly interest on the question of whether NCCR should be subject
to legal regulation. Academic responses have varied widely, with some
scholars seeing the potential criminalization of NCCR as nothing more
than a moral panic that demonstrates the dangerous excesses of “carceral
feminism,” while others see the violation of condom use as negating consent
and therefore as rape or sexual assault.13 Aya Gruber, in a book that charts
how feminist-inspired criminal law reforms have fuelled American mass
incarceration, sees the recent focus on NCCR as part of an effort to close
“loopholes” in “feminist crime control regimes.”14 Masculinities scholar
Ashley Thomson goes further, insisting the “meteoric rise of interest in
stealthing” is nothing more than media-generated panic that bolsters a
neoliberal agenda focused on punishment.15 In a more journalistic account,
Judith Levine responds to recent law reform efforts in several US states,
asserting that the impetus to criminalize NCCR stokes the “sex offender
regime” that drives the prison-industrial-complex.16
This moral panic position rests upon an insistence that claims about
NCCR have been grossly exaggerated. Addressing the rising concern
about deceptive forms of condom removal, Thomson contends that there
is no “objective social reality to speak of in the stealthing panic,” arguing
that Brodsky offers no empirical support for her conclusions about the
ubiquity of this practice or the men perpetrating it.17 She is particularly
sexual activity takes place. Lying about a vasectomy, for example, might constitute fraud negating an
otherwise valid consent where there is a significant risk of serious bodily harm (such as an unwanted
pregnancy), but does not go directly to how the sexual activity is carried out. Lying about being on
the birth-control pill, by contrast, does not go to how the sexual activity is carried out and does not
create a significant risk of serious bodily harm and thus could not lead to a sexual assault conviction.
12. See generally Brodsky, supra note 2.
13. See e.g. Amanda Clough, “Conditional Consent and Purposeful Deception” (2018) 82:2 J Crim L
178; Joseph J Fischel, Screw Consent: A Better Politics of Sexual Justice, 1st ed (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2019).
14. Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime: The Unexpected Role of Women’s Liberation in Mass
Incarceration, 1st ed (Oakland: University of California Press, 2020) at 170.
15. Ashley Thomson, “The Stealthing Panic: Gendered Neoliberalism in Online Media” (2019) 64
Austl Humanities Rev 24 at 26.
16. See Judith Levine, “Is Stealthing a Sex Crime?” (21 June 2017), online: Boston Review
<bostonreview.net/gender-sexuality/judith-levine-stealthing-sex-crime>.
17. Thomson, supra note 15 at 30.
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critical of how Brodsky based her conclusions on qualitative interviews
with a small number of women, and of how the problem of stealthing has,
in turn, been spun by journalists and bloggers intent on increasing their
own media presence.
In arguing that its prevalence has been inflated by feminists, Thomson
ignores a robust empirical literature on NCCR. Kelly Cue Davis and her
colleagues have been engaged in quantitative analysis of the phenomenon
of coercive condom use resistance for the past decade.18 Their work,
involving large scale surveys, focus groups, and experimental research,
has found that nearly a third of young men who primarily date women
admitted to engaging in condom removal without their partner’s consent,
either through coercion, deception (including stealthing), or aggression.19
Rosie L Latimer et al administered a questionnaire to more than 1000
people attending a sexual health clinic in Melbourne and found that nearly
one third of women and nearly one fifth of men who had had penetrative
sex with men reported experiencing NCCR (defined in this study as “the
removal of a condom during sex by a sexual partner when consent has
been given for sex with a condom only”).20 Allira Boadle et al conducted
an online survey of young Australian women who had had sex with
men and found that nearly ten per cent had experienced “a male sexual
partner deliberately removing a condom during sexual intercourse without
their knowledge or consent.”21 Konrad Czechowski et al administered
a survey to nearly 600 Canadian university students and found that of
18. Condom use resistance includes what researchers label as non-coercive tactics (including
seduction, physical sensation arguments, emotional manipulation, relationship-based reasoning,
risk reassurance and sex withholding), as well as coercive tactics (condom sabotage, deception,
and physical threats or force). As Davis and her colleagues have found, condom use resistance is
widespread among young men, with almost 80% reporting that they engage in some form of condom
use resistance. See e.g. Kelly Cue Davis et al, “A Qualitative Examination of Men’s Condom Use
Attitudes and Resistance: ‘It’s Just Part of the Game’” (2014) 43:3 Archives of Sexual Behaviour
631 [Cue Davis et al, “A Qualitative Examination”]; Kelly Cue Davis et al, “Men’s Coercive
Condom Use Resistance: The Roles of Sexual Aggression History, Alcohol Intoxication, and Partner
Condom Negotiation” (2018) 24:11 Violence Against Women 1349; Kelly Cue Davis et al, “Young
Women’s Experiences with Coercive and Noncoercive Condom Use Resistance: Examination
of an Understudied Sexual Risk Behaviour” (2019) 29:3 Women’s Health Issues 231 [Cue Davis
et al, “Young Women’s Experiences”]; Kelly Cue Davis, “‘Stealthing’: Factors Associated with
Young Men’s Nonconsensual Condom Removal” (2019) 38:11 Health Psychology 997 [Cue Davis,
“Stealthing: Factors Associated”].
19. See Cue Davis et al, “A Qualitative Examination,” supra note 18 at 633; Kelly Cue Davis &
Patricia Logan-Greene, “Young Men’s Aggressive Tactics to Avoid Condom Use” (2012) 36:4 Social
Work Research 223 at 228.
20. Rosie L Latimer et al, “Non-Consensual Condom Removal, Reported by Patients at a Sexual
Health Clinic in Melbourne, Australia” (2018) 13:12 PloS One 1 at 1.
21. Allira Boadle, Catherine Gierer & Simone Buzwell, “Young Women Subjected to Nonconsensual
Condom Removal: Prevalence, Risk Factors, and Sexual Self-Perceptions” (2020) 27:10 Violence
Against Women 1696 at 1706.
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the 334 participants who had had penetrative sex with men, 18.7% had
experienced the removal of a condom before or during sexual intercourse
either without their consent or without their knowledge.22 A growing body
of empirical research, then, clearly points to the pervasiveness of NCCR.23
Brodsky’s work on deceptive forms of NCCR may well have gone viral
because it helped women put a name to a widespread experience.
Just as the moral panic position ignores empirical evidence about
the widespread nature of NCCR, so too does it minimize the connections
between this set of practices and gender inequality. In part, this minimization
is accomplished by reducing the complex dynamics involved in NCCR
to the realm of the physical. There is a tendency to view motivations
of perpetrators as narrowly tied to the pursuit of sexual pleasure, while
ignoring the complex subjective and collective harms caused by NCCR
that include—but extend beyond—the physical risks of pregnancy or
sexually transmitted infections [STIs]. This restricted definition of harm
weaves through the arguments of the proponents of the moral panic thesis,
just as it defines the Canadian legal approach to NCCR post–Hutchinson.
As Levine asks, for example, is the “usurpation of consent” involved in
NCCR enough to warrant legal intervention when “no sexually transmitted
infection is contracted and no one gets pregnant”?24
It is critical to displace this myopic emphasis on physical pleasure and
bodily harm and to instead focus on the connections between power, control,
and the contravention of sexual boundaries on the one hand, and NCCR on
the other. By requiring that one’s sexual partner wear a condom, a woman
is not just seeking to protect herself from the physical consequences of
sexual penetration; she is also setting limits on the intimacy of a sexual
encounter—on how the sexual activity occurs. In their study of women’s
negotiation of condom use with men, Nicola Gavey et al demonstrated how
the insistence on condoms is a mechanism of controlling both the course
and outcomes of heterosexual encounters.25 Because NCCR represents
a deliberate transgression of women’s sexual boundaries, it should be
understood as a practice of masculine dominance over female sexuality
and reproduction.26 As Cue Davis underscores, hegemonic gender norms—
including an emphasis on dominance, power, and control—can socialize
22. Czechowski et al, supra note 3 at 16.
23. See also Ebrahim, supra note 2 at 3.
24. Levine, supra note 16.
25. See Nicola Gavey, Kathryn McPhillips & Marion Doherty, “‘If It’s Not On, It’s Not On’: Or Is
It? Discursive Constraints on Women’s Condom Use” (2001) 15:6 Gender & Society 917 at 931.
26. See generally Ebrahim, supra note 2; Brodsky, supra note 2; Cue Davis et al, “Young Women’s
Experiences,” supra note 18; Boadle, Gierer & Buzwell, supra note 21.
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men in ways that increase their risk of perpetrating NCCR.27 Easy access
to pornography, where NCCR is portrayed as a tactic of male conquest,
has also been found to be a contributing factor.28 Having a sexual assault
perpetration history is also predictive of an intention to engage in NCCR,
and men who hold misogynist beliefs have much higher likelihoods of
engaging in it.29
Brodsky’s work also draws attention to the motivations behind deceptive
forms of NCCR, describing online communities where men share their
stealthing practices and rationalize their behaviour through misogynist
discourses, like their “‘right’ to spread [their] seed.”30 Brodsky highlights
the close connections between online stealthing proponents and the pickup
artist community, a subgroup of the men’s rights movement advocating
sexual conquest through strategies such as deception and manipulation.
This seduction paradigm is rooted in an increasingly dominant form of
heterosexual masculinity in which masculine status is based upon getting
women sexually and being chosen for sex.31 Overcoming women’s
resistance through manipulation and deception is made into a contest of
masculinity. It is not simply that men who engage in NCCR disregard
their victims’ reproductive rights and sexual agency, but they may in
fact be aroused by it.32 Exemplifying Catharine MacKinnon’s theoretical
arguments about the eroticization of domination, it is the transgression of
boundaries through NCCR that makes perpetrators feel aroused, powerful,
and masculine.33
Dominant discourses of heterosexual masculinity—emphasizing
power, control, and objectification—are also in evidence in how women
subjectively experience NCCR, as well as the systemic, collective
implications of this set of practices. Czechowski et al asked their survey
participants a series of open-ended questions about whether they felt
NCCR was wrong, and on what basis. Nearly all of the 432 women
participants felt it was wrong. While many women participants described
the harms in terms of potential outcomes, such as the physical risks of
pregnancy (36.6%) or STIs (35%), the majority conceptualized NCCR as
a consent violation (61.3%) (“participants expressed that consent to sex
27. See Cue Davis, “Stealthing: Factors Associated,” supra note 18 at 997.
28. See e.g. Marwa Ahmad et al, “‘You Do It without Their Knowledge.’ Assessing Knowledge and
Perception of Stealthing Among College Students” (2020) 17:10 Intl J Environmental Research &
Public Health at 6.
29. See Cue Davis, “Stealthing: Factors Associated,” supra note 18 at 997.
30. Brodsky, supra note 2 at 189. See also Gotell & Grant, supra note 10 at 787.
31. See Ben A McJunkin, “Deconstructing Rape by Fraud” (2014) 28:1 Colum J Gender & L 1 at 26.
32. See Ebrahim, supra note 2 at 6.
33. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 1.
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with a condom is separate from consent without a condom, since ‘[their]
answer to having sex could change whether or not [there] is protection’”).34
A minority (15.3%) also saw it as a betrayal of trust, and some (5.5%)
explicitly labelled it as “sexual violence.”35 The women in Brodsky’s article
experienced deceptive condom removal as a “disempowering, demeaning
violation of a sexual agreement” and conceptualized NCCR as an act of
control.36 Boadle et al found that NCCR undermines women’s sexual
agency; survivors were less confident to refuse sexual advances and felt less
in control of themselves sexually. As these researchers contend, “women
who experienced NCCR developed negative self-perceptions about their
sexual agency after being exposed to a sexual encounter that violated their
bodily autonomy.”37 As these studies emphasize, women view NCCR as a
violation of sexual boundaries that negates their consent, causing complex
forms of harm, whether or not their partners use deception, and whether or
not they experience a risk of pregnancy or STIs.
These damaging experiences of disempowerment and violation are
reinforced by the uncertainty regarding the legality of what has occurred.
Even as attitudes around sexual assault shift in the #MeToo era, the myth
of “real rape” as violent stranger rape continues to hold sway, shaping
perceptions of experiences of NCCR, as well as the responses of criminal
justice actors.38 There are very high rates of “unacknowledged rape” in
circumstances that depart from this stereotype.39 As Breanna Chesser and
April Zahra have argued in their discussion of legal responses to NCCR,
“where a complainant’s account deviates from the stereotypical incidence
of sexual assault, offences are left largely unreported.”40 The lack of clarity
in the law about whether condom refusal, removal, deception, and sabotage
negate consent to the sexual activity in question no doubt deters survivors
from coming forward to make police reports.41 Just as concerning, and
34. Czechowski et al, supra note 3 at 12.
35. Ibid at 11-13.
36. Brodsky, supra note 2 at 186.
37. Boadle, Gierner & Buzwell, supra note 21 at 1708.
38. See generally Elaine Craig, “Feminism, Public Dialogue and Sexual Assault Law” in Fiona
MacDonald & Alexandra Dobrowolsky, eds, Turbulent Times, Transformational Possibilities?:
Gender and Politics Today and Tomorrow (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020) 100.
39. See Holly Johnson, “Limits of a Criminal Justice Response: Trends in Police and Court
Processing of Sexual Assault” in Elizabeth A Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal
Practice and Women’s Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012) 613 at 613; Sylvie
Lévesque & Catherine Rousseau, “Young Women’s Acknowledgment of Reproductive Coercion: A
Qualitative Analysis” (2021) 36:15–16 J Interpersonal Violence NP8200 at NP8204.
40. Brianna Chesser & April Zahra, “Stealthing: A Criminal Offence?” (2019) 31:2 Current Issues in
Crim Justice 217 at 219.
41. As American researchers Laura C Wilson and Katherine E Miller have found in their metaanalysis of the prevalence of unacknowledged rape, as many as 60% of women who report having
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because law plays such a powerful role in shaping “attitudes, beliefs, and
behavior through its messages and lessons,” the uncertain legal status of
NCCR represents a failure to harness law’s expressive role.42 As Danielle
Citron argues, when public sentiment about a specific behaviour is
unclear, the law can play a role in shifting behaviours, and, by recognizing
forms of harm, the law can ideally restore some of the agency that sexual
victimization took away.43
Because the purpose of sexual assault law is to protect sexual
integrity, it is important for us to consider the harms of NCCR from the
perspective of survivors. But it is also important to interrogate the obvious
connections between individual violations and substantive inequality.
A liberal, individualized conceptualization of autonomy can limit our
ability to fully appreciate the harms of NCCR, or of sexual violence more
generally.44 Overriding a woman’s insistence on condom use reinforces
sexual inequality at a systemic level. As Sharon Marcus contends, we
need to pay attention to the interplay between social structures that
inscribe “misogynist inequalities [upon gendered bodies] which enable
rape to occur.”45 Despite increasing representations of women as sexually
empowered, aggression and deception remain deeply entrenched in heteropatriarchal sexual scripts, with normative hetero-sex still depicted as
something that men do to women.46 NCCR denies the survivor of her status
as subject, constructing her sexuality as an instrument of the perpetrator’s
purposes. The harms of NCCR (like the harms of sexual assault more
experiences that meet the legal definition of rape do not label their experiences as rape; they “instead
use more benign labels such as ‘bad sex’ or ‘miscommunication’”: Laura C Wilson & Katherine E
Miller, “Meta-Analysis of the Prevalence of Unacknowledged Rape” (2016) 17:2 Trauma, Violence
& Abuse 149 at 149. While most survivors describe that they experienced NCCR as non-consensual
sex, many are reluctant to reach the logical conclusion that non-consensual sex is a form of “sexual
assault” or “rape” because of the consequences of defining oneself as a victim and stereotypes around
what is a “real” rape. In qualitative research with women who had experienced reproductive coercion
and NCCR, Sylvie Lévesque and Catherine Rousseau found that survivors were reluctant to label their
experiences as sexual aggression even though they described their experience as non-consensual. A
number of factors impeded this acknowledgement, including assuming responsibility, downplaying the
incident, being in an intimate relationship marked by violence, and having difficulty self-identifying
as a victim. The women interviewed by Lévesque and Rousseau who had experienced NCCR blamed
themselves, believing that “they should have made it clearer that they had not consented, even though
they had repeatedly said that they wanted to use a condom.” Lévesque & Rousseau, supra note 39 at
NP8213.
42. Danielle Keats Citron, “Sexual Privacy” (2019) 128:7 Yale LJ 1870 at 1945.
43. See generally ibid.
44. See Ebrahim, supra note 2 at 4.
45. Sharon Marcus, “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention”
in Judith Butler & Joan Wallach Scott, eds, Feminists Theorize the Political (New York: Routledge,
1992) 385 at 391.
46. See e.g. Kristen N Jozkowski & Zoë D Peterson, “College Students and Sexual Consent: Unique
Insights” (2013) 50:6 J Sex Research 517 at 519.
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generally) are located in its particular violation of the subjective bodily
integrity of the survivor, whose personhood is denied, in addition to the
increased physical risk to which she is subjected.47 The objectification
inherent in NCCR reinforces male-dominated heterosexuality by denying
women their status as sexual subjects who can choose what sexual activity
in which to engage. Individual experiences of NCCR shore up their social
function and vice versa, as the two levels of effect are intricately related.
Those who advance the moral panic position ignore these systemic
harms and obfuscate the connections between NCCR and women’s
inequality. While acknowledging that NCCR may be an ethical wrong,
Thomson locates calls for legal regulation within the punitive logic of
“gendered neoliberalism.”48 She castigates those feminists who insist upon
the recognition of NCCR as a legal wrong as “carceral.” Decrying feminist
participation in punitive logics, Levine contends that sex is inevitably a
“risky business” and implies that individual responsibility and riskmanagement should be the preferred responses of potential victims to the
moral harms caused by NCCR.49
Both Levine and Thomson are contributing to an important debate
about the limits of criminalization and the implications for stigmatized
communities, such as people who are HIV positive. However, taken to their
logical end, such critiques veer towards the decriminalization of sexual
violence, because NCCR is no different than other consent violations. We
do not require a risk of pregnancy or an STI to recognize the harm of sexual
assault in other contexts. By trivializing the experience of NCCR, these
critics embed a troubling form of sexual libertarianism that characterizes
the critiques of the carceral feminism thesis more generally. This is a
postfeminist form of anti-statism, in which state regulation of sexual harm
is condemned as schoolmarmish.50 The carceral feminism critique paints
an inaccurate picture of the state as a monolithic instrument captured by
governance feminists.51 Not only does this overstate the contemporary
power of feminism in contexts of neoliberalism and rising right-wing
populism, but this position also risks re-privatizing and depoliticizing the
gendered problem of sexual violence. The carceral feminism critique also

47. See Ann J Cahill, Rethinking Rape, 1st ed (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001) at 142.
48. See Thomson, supra note 15 at 25.
49. See Levine, supra note 16.
50. See generally Lise Gotell, “Reassessing the Place of Criminal Law Reform in the Struggle
Against Sexual Violence: A Critique of the Critique of Carceral Feminism” in Anastasia Powell,
Nicola Henry & Asher Flynn, eds, Rape Justice: Beyond the Criminal Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015) 53.
51. See ibid.
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misrepresents the feminist criminal law reform agenda, an agenda that, at
least in Canada, has never been primarily focused on punishment. Instead,
as Lise Gotell has demonstrated, Canadian feminist engagement with
criminal law has been largely directed at survivor-centered outcomes,
including the extent to which law reflects and condemns women’s
experiences of sexual violence, while attempting to prevent legal
revictimization of survivors.52
Given its serious bodily, dignitary, and collective harms, there is a
clear case for recognizing NCCR as sexual assault within Canadian
law, whether or not there is a risk of unwanted pregnancy or an STI and
whether or not the circumstances involve deception. The majority decision
in Hutchinson works against this recognition by removing NCCR from
the scope of consent and treating it instead as something that can vitiate
an otherwise valid consent. NCCR will only be criminalized where there
is deception and where complainants face a significant risk of unwanted
pregnancy or an STI, thereby minimizing the non-bodily harms of condom
sabotage and obscuring the serious impacts for women’s agency, equality,
and sense of safety in the world.
II. The Canadian legal framework—R v Hutchinson: Limiting the scope
of consent
By the end of the twentieth century, Canadian feminists could claim credit
for fundamental changes to the Criminal Code provisions on sexual assault,
with new evidentiary restrictions on sexual history (section 276), strict
limitations on the disclosure of complainants’ confidential records (section
278.1–278.9) and, most crucially, the codification of a strong framework
for consent.53 From the foundation established through these amendments,
52. See ibid. See also Wendy Larcombe, “Falling Rape Conviction Rates: (Some) Feminist Aims
and Measures for Rape Law” (2011) 19:1 Fem Leg Stud 27.
53. See Criminal Code, supra note 6, s 273.1(1). The enumerated examples where no consent is
obtained can be found at ss 273.1(2)(a)–(e):
For the purpose of [this section], no consent is obtained if (a) the agreement is expressed by the
words or conduct of a person other than the complainant; […] (b) the complainant is incapable of
consenting to the activity[…]; (c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity
by abusing a position of trust, power or authority; (d) the complainant expresses, by words or
conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity; or (e) the complainant, having consented
to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to
engage in the activity.
Section 273.2 provides that
[i]t is not a defence […] that the accused believed that the complainant consented […] where (a)
the accused’s belief arose from (i) the accused’s self-induced intoxication [or] (ii) the accused’s
recklessness or wilful blindness, or […] (b) the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the
circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting.
Most recently, s 273.2(c) has limited the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to
circumstances where there is evidence “that the complainant’s voluntary agreement to the activity was

Non-Consensual Condon Removal in Canadian Law
Before and After R. v. Hutchinson

13

the starting point of sexual assault trials has shifted away from the
assumption that women exist in a state of perpetual consent, towards the
requirement that there be some positive evidence of agreement. Canada
has moved further in the direction of an affirmative consent standard than
many other jurisdictions.54
In R v Ewanchuk,55 the Supreme Court established a standard for
consent that approaches “only yes means yes” by unanimously ruling
that consent cannot be implied, and that silence, passivity, or ambiguous
conduct cannot be taken as indications of consent.56 The Court defined
the actus reus of sexual assault as non-consensual sexual touching, where
consent is determined from the subjective perspective of the complainant
at the time of the sexual contact and depends on whether she wanted
the sexual activity to take place.57 Steps to re-establish agreement are
needed after someone has withdrawn consent.58 Subsequent decisions
have reinforced an affirmative consent standard by requiring that consent
must be specific to the sexual activity in question59 and by holding that
an accused must have taken active and positive steps to secure agreement
in order to raise the defence of mistaken belief.60 As the Supreme Court
confirmed in R v Goldfinch, “[t]oday, not only does no mean no, but only
yes means yes. Nothing less than positive affirmation is required.”61 In
R v JA, the Court determined that there can be no advance consent to
sexual contact that takes place during unconsciousness, emphasizing that
consent must be ongoing during each moment of a sexual encounter and
“must be specifically directed to each and every sexual act…‘at the time
it occur[s].’”62
The majority decision in Hutchinson, which raises the fundamental
question of what you consent to when you agree to engage in sexual
activity, represents a significant retreat from these hard-fought-for advances
in the law of consent and a retreat from a truly subjective approach to
consent which focuses on the complainant’s perspective. Defence lawyers
affirmatively expressed by words or actively expressed by conduct.”
54. See Craig, supra note 38 at 102; Lise Gotell, “Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberalism
and the Erosion of Feminist-Inspired Law Reforms” in Clare McGlynn & Vanessa E Munro, eds,
Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (London: Routledge-Cavendish,
2010) 209 at 209.
55. [1999] 1 SCR 330, 169 DLR (4th) 193 [Ewanchuk].
56. See ibid at para 51.
57. See ibid at para 49.
58. See ibid at para 52.
59. See e.g. R v Goldfinch, 2019 SCC 38 [Goldfinch]; R v JA, 2011 SCC 28 [JA].
60. See e.g. R v Gagnon, 2018 SCC 41; R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 [Barton].
61. Goldfinch, supra note 59 at para 44.
62. JA, supra note 59 at para 34, citing Ewanchuk, supra note 55 at para 26.
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and some judges have voiced concerns that affirmative consent imposes
unrealistic requirements on sexual interactions, reflecting underlying fears
about over-criminalizing behaviours that were previously seen as merely
immoral.63 Such concerns about over-criminalization were at the heart
of the Hutchinson appeal, which was decided under the shadow of the
Supreme Court’s harshly punitive approach to HIV non-disclosure.64 In R
v Cuerrier,65 a case that began at the height of the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
the Court determined that HIV non-disclosure even without transmission
could be prosecuted as a form of aggravated assault or aggravated sexual
assault.66 This decision extended the common law of fraud beyond
deceptions about the sexual nature of the act and the identity of the sexual
partner to include deceptions that create “a significant risk of serious
bodily harm,” vitiating the complainant’s consent under section 265(3)(c)
of the Criminal Code.67 In an effort to clearly demarcate what deceptions
should be subject to criminalization, the Cuerrier majority conflated sexual
63. See Lise Gotell, “Thinly Construing the Nature of the Act Legally Consented To: The Corrosive
Implications of R v Hutchinson for the Law of Consent” (2020) 53:1 UBC L Rev 53 at 63-64. See also
Craig, supra note 38.
64. See Isabel Grant, “The Complex Legacy of R v Cuerrier: HIV Nondisclosure Prosecutions
and Their Impact on Sexual Assault Law” (2020) 58:1 Alta L Rev 45 at 63 [Grant, “The Complex
Legacy”].
65. [1998] 2 SCR 371, 162 DLR (4th) 513 [Cuerrier].
66. See ibid at para 128.
67. See ibid at paras 6-7. More recently in R v Mabior, 2012 SCC 47 [Mabior], the Court responded
to criticisms of the overbreadth of the significant risk test, which has resulted in people with HIV
being convicted of aggravated sexual assault in circumstances where possibility of transmission was
infinitesimal. In Mabior, the significant risk test was framed as requiring that the Crown establish a
“realistic possibility of transmission”; this realistic possibility would be negated if the accused could
establish they had a low viral load at the time in question and if a condom was used: see ibid at
paras 93-94. Critics argue that the Mabior decision expanded the criminalization of people with HIV
because it required both condom use and antiretroviral compliance in order to escape criminalization
for HIV non-disclosure. See generally Isabel Grant, “The Over-Criminalization of Persons with HIV”
(2013) 63:3 UTLJ 475.
Because of criticisms of this harshly punitive approach, the Director of Public Prosecutions
has issued a prosecutorial directive restricting HIV prosecutions. See Public Prosecution Service
of Canada, Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook (Ottawa: Attorney General of Canada,
2018), part V, s 5.12. As Grant explains,
The directive indicates that federal prosecutions will not be initiated where the person living with
HIV has maintained a suppressed viral load, and that prosecutors will “generally not prosecute”
where a person used a condom, engaged only in oral sex, or was taking treatment as prescribed,
unless other risk factors were present: Grant, “The Complex Legacy,” supra note 64 at 48.
It is noteworthy that the federal government only prosecutes Criminal Code offences in the Territories.
See ibid at 48, nn 12-14.
The Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (2019) has issued a position paper recommending
that HIV non-disclosure be removed from sexual offences and that a new summary conviction offence
be created that would restrict criminalization to intentional or reckless transmission. See LEAF
(Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund), “A Feminist Approach to Law Reform on HIV NonDisclosure” (January 2019), online (pdf): <leaf.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2019-01-08-LEAFHIV-ND-Position-Paper-FINAL.pdf>.
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fraud with a risk of serious bodily harm. The legal approach developed
in Cuerrier has resulted in both the over-criminalization of HIV nondisclosure and a restricted interpretation of the doctrine of fraud vitiating
consent in other circumstances.68 The concern in Hutchinson was that a
broad reading of voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question
might include whether someone was HIV-positive, which would eliminate
the restrictions on HIV non-disclosure prosecutions developed through the
fraud route.
Hutchinson raised the issue of sexual fraud outside of the HIV context
for the first time at the Supreme Court and revealed the limits of the HIVdriven conception of fraud. The complainant in Hutchinson had been
in a relationship with the accused, during which time she insisted that
he wear condoms during intercourse.69 The accused, who was trying to
keep the complainant in a failing relationship, secretly poked holes in the
condoms they were using. After discovering that she was pregnant, and
after terminating the relationship, the complainant underwent an abortion
and experienced significant complications.70 She became aware that the
accused had sabotaged the condoms only afterwards, through a series of
harassing text messages and phone calls.71 Hutchinson’s act of condom
sabotage is an example of reproductive coercion—restricting reproductive
decision-making through power and control tactics. Hutchinson believed
he could maintain control over his sexual partner by forcing her to become
pregnant. As a recent systematic review has found, reproductive coercion
is strongly associated with domestic violence.72
In the majority opinion in Hutchinson, these connections were
completely absent in reasons that decontextualized the complainant’s
choice to engage in sexual intercourse only with a condom and constructed
her repeated refusals to participate in unprotected sex as irrelevant to the
consent inquiry. The majority recognized that the risk of an unwanted
pregnancy is a risk of bodily harm, yet it failed to link the deception to
whether the complainant subjectively consented. This decontextualized
68. We believe this approach has resulted in over-criminalization because the law criminalizes
people who do not disclose their HIV status even where they use a condom or have a low viral load.
In other words, the law criminalizes individuals where there is almost no risk of transmitting HIV. See
Grant, “The Complex Legacy,” supra note 64 at 63.
69. See R v Hutchinson, 2013 NSCA 1 at paras 1-2 [Hutchinson CA].
70. See ibid at para 8.
71. See ibid at para 6.
72. See Karen Trister Grace & Jocelyn C Anderson, “Reproductive Coercion: A Systematic Review”
(2018) 19:4 Trauma Violence Abuse 371 at 383. See also Elizabeth Miller et al, “Reproductive
Coercion: Connecting the Dots Between Partner Violence and Unintended Pregnancy” (2010) 81:6
Contraception 457; Leah A Plunkett, “Contraceptive Sabotage” (2014) 28:1 Colum J Gender & L 97.
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framing fails to acknowledge the accused’s actions as intimate partner
violence, constructing sexual assault as nothing more than people deciding
to start or stop sexual activity, informed by narrow liberal construction
of sexual autonomy that is abstracted from conditions of inequality.73
This framing obscures how the accused’s abuse limited the complainant’s
choice to engage in the sexual activity in the first place.
The central issue in Hutchinson was how to define voluntary agreement
to “the sexual activity in question” under section 273.1(1) of the Criminal
Code. Was “the sexual activity in question” in Hutchinson simply vaginal
intercourse, or was it vaginal intercourse with a condom? The majority,
per Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Cromwell, determined that the
sexual activity in question does not include whether a condom was used,
holding that the complainant had subjectively consented, but that her
consent had been vitiated by fraud.74 The concurring minority, per Justices
Abella and Moldaver, concluded that the complainant had not consented
to unprotected sex and there was no need to consider fraud vitiating
consent.75
The majority opinion was a clear departure from Ewanchuk, although
purporting to uphold that decision. In Ewanchuk, the Court had emphasized
that the objective of sexual assault law lies in “[h]aving control over who
touches one’s body and how,” which “lies at the core of human dignity and
autonomy.”76 In JA, the majority used the example of condom use when
arguing that “the unconscious partner cannot meaningfully control how
her person is being touched, leaving her open to abuse.”77 In Hutchinson,
the majority removed the “how” of the sexual touching from the consent
inquiry.78 As a result, the purpose of sexual assault law comes to be defined
through a superficial construction of sexual autonomy as the decision
to engage in a type of sexual activity,79 abstracted from the very real
distinction between sex with a condom and without, all in the name of
restraint in criminal law.80 The doctrinal approach to HIV non-disclosure
drove the majority’s decision in Hutchinson, with the majority holding that
73. See further Janine Benedet, “Marital Rape, Polygamy, and Prostitution: Trading Sex Equality for
Agency and Choice” (2013) 18:2 Rev Const Stud 161 at 174 (discussing a narrow liberal concept of
autonomy).
74. See Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 6.
75. See Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 79.
76. Ewanchuk, supra note 55 at para 28 (emphasis added).
77. JA, supra note 59 at para 60 (emphasis added).
78. See further Grant, “The Complex Legacy,” supra note 64 at 69 (demonstrating that the Hutchinson
majority actually took the word “how” out of its description of the passage from Ewanchuk).
79. See Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 22.
80. See ibid at para 19.
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consistency and certainty in the law required all deceptions to be treated in
the same way under section 265(3)(c).81
The majority thus posited a two-step approach to consent with only
agreement to the “physical sexual act” (divorced from its context),
the sexual nature of the touching, and the identity of the person doing
the touching being relevant to the consent inquiry.82 The sexual act is
understood to encompass activities such as “kissing, petting, oral sex,
intercourse, or the use of sex toys,” but to exclude “the conditions or
qualities of the physical act.”83 Implausibly, for the many people who
make condom use an integral part of their sexual practices, this restricted
understanding of sexual activity means that the scope of consent includes
agreeing to intercourse, but not agreeing only to intercourse with a condom.
“Effective condom use,” according to the majority decision, “is a method
of contraception and protection against sexually transmitted disease; it is
not a sex act.”84 The second step looks to factors that might vitiate an
otherwise valid consent, which the Court describes in its later decision in
R v GF as “policy considerations.”85
The majority decision rests on an impoverished conception of sexual
autonomy divorced from any recognition of the inequality women have
historically faced around control of their reproduction and sexuality. Women
are made individually responsible for monitoring any risks or threats not
encompassed within the narrow definition of “sexual activity in question,”
as these are placed outside the scope of consent, and beyond criminal legal
regulation when there is no deception or significant risk of serious bodily
harm. By contrast, the concurring opinion in Hutchison characterized “the
complainant’s right to determine how he or she is sexually touched” as
a “hard-fought legislative protection,” in a manner that gestures towards
the systemic consequences of NCCR for gender equality.86 The majority’s
approach is flawed, the minority contended, because it suggests that only
condom sabotage that could result in pregnancy (or where the accused
had an STI) would constitute fraud vitiating consent, thereby failing to
uphold a complainant’s “legal right” to insist on condom use for whatever
reason she chooses.87 Sexual assault must be defined as sexual touching

81. See ibid at para 38.
82. See ibid at para 54, affirming Farrar JA’s interpretation of the “sexual activity in question” in
Hutchinson CA, supra note 69.
83. Ibid at paras 54-55.
84. See ibid at para 64.
85. R v GF, 2021 SCC 20 at para 36 [GF].
86. Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 102.
87. See ibid at para 98.
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in a manner that is contrary to the complainant’s wishes.88 The minority
stopped short of adopting a fully conditional concept of consent that
would allow the complainant to put any conditions on her consent based
on what matters to her, an approach that might include other aspects of a
sexual agreement beyond how the sexual touching occurs.89 Instead, the
minority emphasized that the scope of consent must include the how of the
sexual touching, and that being touched by a penis sheathed in a condom
is a different sexual activity than being touched by an unsheathed penis.90
By narrowing the scope of consent and reinforcing the myth of “real
rape” as defined by physical violence, the Hutchinson majority decision
represents a backwards shift in Canadian law.91 The effect of this decision
is to shift the focus of NCCR cases from the analysis of subjective consent,
where it belongs, to the analysis of vitiating factors.
The Supreme Court of Canada has further complicated the relationship
between fraud and consent in the 2021 decision in GF.92 There, the Court
doubled down on the two-step approach to consent from Hutchinson. The
first step is whether the complainant gave what is referred to in GF as to as
“subjective consent.” The second step is whether that subjective consent
is effective “as a matter of law” or whether it is vitiated for some policy
reason.93 Hutchinson had the effect of shifting most of the conceptual limits
on consent to the second step, suggesting that all the factors in section
273.1(2) that put constraints on consent act to vitiate consent rather than to
negate it from the outset.94
88. See ibid at para 102.
89. See generally Clough, supra note 13; Fischel, supra note 13 (for a discussion of the conditional
model of consent).
90. The approach taken by the minority is similar to the decision of the British High Court of Justice
in Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority, [2011] EWHC 2489 (finding an absence of consent as
a result of the accused’s NCCR when the complainant had specified that she was only agreeing to
protected intercourse).
91. This artificially narrow conception of the scope of consent has even led the Criminal Lawyers’
Association of Ontario (CLA) to rely on Hutchinson to make the outlandish argument that the degree
of force with which the sexual activity is accomplished is also not included within the definition of
consent. While this argument was ultimately not addressed by the Supreme Court in Barton, one can
see the dangerous potential of a position that lets men unilaterally decide how much force to use during
sexual activity. See generally Barton, supra note 60. The CLA factum stated at para 8:
The Court of Appeal said the jury ought to have considered whether [the victim] subjectively
consented to “sexual activity that involved the degree of force required” to cause her injuries.
This reasoning is inconsistent with Hutchinson. Consent to the “sexual activity in question”
under s. 273.1 only requires agreement to the basic physical act, not the precise manner in which
the act is carried out: R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 (Factum of the Criminal Lawyers’ Association
of Ontario).
92. Supra note 85.
93. See ibid at para 33.
94. See supra note 53 for the relevant Criminal Code provisions.
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The GF Court did limit Hutchinson by clarifying that capacity to
consent in section 273.1(2) is a precondition to consent, not something that
vitiates an otherwise valid consent: no capacity, no consent.95 However,
all the factors listed in section 265(3), including fraud and whether the
complainant was faced with force or threats of force, only vitiate consent. In
other words, subjective consent is present and the threat of force is a policy
reason for vitiating that subjective consent. Of the list of factors limiting
consent in section 273.1(2), only the abuse of trust, power, or authority
is said to vitiate consent rather than negating it from the outset. While
this reasoning limits Hutchinson somewhat, it still narrows what is left of
subjective consent. It is also inconsistent with decades of sexual assault
case law. Someone who submits to sexual activity because of “threats or
fear of the application of force to the complainant” (which the GF majority
labelled as vitiating under section 265(3)(b)) is not subjectively consenting;
she is acquiescing to protect herself from violence. Ewanchuk made clear
that such submission is not consent. While the GF majority says that a
complainant can refuse consent at step one “for whatever reason,”96 in fact
those reasons are limited to a narrow set of factors the Court has decided
are valid reasons for refusing consent—and whether a condom is used is
not one of them.
As we demonstrate below, the Court’s narrowing of the scope of
subjective consent has left a confusing legacy for the analysis of whether
condom use is within the scope of what a woman subjectively consents to
when she consents to sexual activity. In our view, overriding someone’s
insistence on condom use, whether through deceit or outright refusal, must
be viewed as a violation of subjective consent. A conception of sexual
autonomy tied to the value of equality demands nothing less.
III. Case law survey
We examined cases decided since 1999 (when Ewanchuk established an
affirmative consent standard) in which complainants specifically agreed to
sexual activity with a condom, but not without. We searched LexisNexis
Quicklaw and CanLII using the following terms: “condom” AND “consent”
AND “sexual assault.”97 This search produced a large number of results
that did not involve NCCR because reference to condoms is ubiquitous
in sexual assault decisions. Judicial considerations of condom use outside
95. See GF, supra note 85 at para 43.
96. Ibid at para 33.
97. Narrower searches, for example, <“conditional consent” AND condom AND “sexual assault,”>
or <“condom removal” AND “sexual assault”> failed to identify decisions that involved circumstances
of NCCR.
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of the specific circumstances of NCCR demonstrate that Canadian judges
appreciate differences between sex with a condom and sex without a
condom. These differences are viewed as being consequential to the
riskiness of sex, and unprotected penetration is understood as intensifying
the harmfulness of sexual assault. Judicial recognition of a distinction
between protected and unprotected sex sits at odds with the majority
decision in Hutchinson, which positioned condom use as outside the scope
of consent to sexual activity.
Judicial analysis of condom use and consent arises in cases around
the assessment of DNA evidence and in other circumstances beyond the
scope of our NCCR inquiry. For example, the search produced cases in
which the complainant’s capacity to consent was at issue, and where her
demand that the accused wear a condom was used to argue that she had
an “appreciation of the nature and quality of the sexual activity and an
understanding that she could agree or decline to engage in, or to continue,
the sexual activity.”98 Conversely, in some decisions, the complainant’s
inability to assess the risk of sex without a condom was treated as evidence
that she was incapable of consent.99 Insistence on condom use might
also be used to argue a mistaken belief in consent on the basis that the
complainant had asked the accused to wear a condom in the course of a
sexual assault. In R v Terkelsen, a conversation about condom use was
portrayed as a marker of responsible sexual behaviour, not as an indicator
of agreement to the sexual activity that followed:
I must recognize that in our modern society the fact that a young woman
asks or asked about condoms is perfectly normal behaviour….[It]
displays a mature approach to the prospect of intimate contact between
two strangers. Any number of public health advertisements would
counsel the same approach. Safe sex practices are taught in school.
There is really nothing significant about the complainant initiating this
discussion or addressing the subject.100

HIV nondisclosure prosecutions also consider whether a condom was used
because of the impact on the significance of the risk.101 Finally, the failure
to wear a condom in the course of a sexual assault frequently appears in
sentencing decisions where it is treated as an aggravating factor.102
98. See R v Percy, 2018 NSPC 57 at para 106 [Percy].
99. See R v Cubillan, 2015 ONSC 969 at para 36 [Cubillan].
100. R v Terkelsen, 2016 ONCJ 702 at para 130.
101. See e.g. R v NG, 2020 ONCA 494. See also Grant, “The Complex Legacy,” supra note 64 at 5758, 62.
102. See e.g. R v Owolabi Adejojo, 2019 QCCQ 1555 at para 120; R v Bohorquez and Siddiqi, 2019
ONSC 1643 at para 97; R v BZ, 2019 ONSC 2375 at para 25; R v Ignacio, 2019 ONSC 2832 at para
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Our case law review of NCCR demonstrates, prior to Hutchinson,
judges were clear that whether a condom was used was relevant to consent.
After Hutchinson, there are conflicting decisions. Several judges have
actively resisted following Hutchinson either by simply not citing it or by
attempting to distinguish it. Hutchinson, which positioned condom use as
collateral to consent to sexual activity, is the outlier.
We found only 19 reported sexual assault cases in which a complainant
claimed that her consent to sexual activity was premised on condom use
(although in some of these cases there was a basis to find no consent
even with a condom).103 A large majority of these cases were decided
post-Hutchinson (15), with most decided after 2016. While the empirical
research demonstrates that NCCR is also experienced by men who have
penetrative sex with men,104 none of the reported cases involved male
complainants. All of the accused were men, and all of the complainants
were women. Young women, in particular, are known to be at greater
risk of NCCR,105 and where age is reported in the decisions (13 cases),
all but one of the complainants and accused were under 30. The largest
group of cases (seven) involved people intentionally meeting up for casual
sexual encounters, often (five) after connecting on internet dating apps.
As Boadle et al found, participating in casual sex, or what is known as
“hookup culture,” appears to be a “risk factor” for NCCR.106 Two cases
involved complainants who agreed to exchange sex for money but only if
a condom was worn.107 While NCCR includes deceptive and overt tactics,

23; R v McCaw, 2019 ONSC 3906 at para 58; R v Razak, 2019 BCSC 1677 at para 77; R v Russ, 2019
BCSC 229 at para 32; R v Solorzano Sanclemente, 2019 ONSC 695 at para 49.
103. The pre-Hutchinson cases are as follows: R v Watson, 2007 CanLII 26 (Ont SC) [Watson]; R v
Perkins, 2007 ONCA 585 [Perkins]; R v Changoo, 2009 ONCJ 220 [Changoo]; R v Poirier, [2014]
ABCA 59 [Poirier]. The post-Hutchinson cases are: R v Dadmand, 2016 BCSC 1565 [Dadmand]; R
v SY, 2017 ONCJ 798 [SY]; R v DG, 2018 ONCJ 727 [DG]; R v Landry, 2019 ONSC 3700 [Landry];
R v BL, 2021 ONCA 373 [BL]; R v Lupi, 2019 ONSC 3713 [Lupi]; R v Rivera, 2019 ONSC 3918 ;
R v Ukpebor, 2019 ABQB 261 [Ukepbor]; R v Ljiljanic, 2019 ONSC 6316; R v BAS, 2020 BCSC
657; R v Ma, 2020 ONCA 358 [Ma]; R v Tso, 2020 BCCA 358 [Tso]; Kirkpatrick, supra note 10; R
v Kraft, 2021 ONSC 1970; R v IAD, 2021 ONCA 110 [IAD]. While these cases involve NCCR, they
were not all decided on this basis. Watson involved an unsuccessful defence application to exclude
evidence on the basis of unreasonable search and seizure in the context of a man charged with sexual
assault causing bodily harm. The complainant was involved in the sex trade and refused consent when
the accused refused to wear a condom. DG and Ukepbor were decided on the basis of credibility and
failure to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. Landry was decided on the basis of no
consent to intercourse.
104. See e.g. Czeckowski et al, supra note 3 at 2; Latimer et al, supra note 20 at 5.
105. See Boadle, Gierer & Buzwell, supra note 21 at 1697.
106. See ibid at 1699.
107. See Watson, supra note 103; Ma, supra note 103.
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a large majority of these cases (15) did not involve “stealthing,” but instead
the overt refusal to wear a condom.108
That there are so few cases, despite empirical research showing the
prevalence of NCCR, is not surprising. As we have emphasized, the lack
of clarity around the legal status of NCCR is likely to result in low police
reporting rates. The uncertainty about whether condom removal, refusal,
or sabotage constitutes an absence of consent under section 273 may mean
that even when survivors report to police, charges are unlikely to be laid.
A recent British Columbia case demonstrates this confusion. A woman
who reported an incident of stealthing to the RCMP was told by the
investigating officer, “‘Well, you know, you consented to sex, so there’s
no rape or crime.’”109 The complainant had to show extraordinary fortitude
and speak to seven different officers before the accused was finally arrested
and charged several weeks later.
IV. Pre-Hutchinson decisions involving NCCR
In the four decisions rendered before Hutchinson, judges assessed
allegations of NCCR within the scope of the subjective consent inquiry,
recognizing that consent to protected sex is a different sexual activity than
consent to unprotected sex.
In R v Perkins,110 the accused testified that he had worn a condom during
consensual sex, but it fell off when he lost his erection. The complainant
testified that the accused raped her without a condom. The Court of Appeal
for Ontario made it clear that consent to sex with a condom is different
than consent to sex without:
It was common ground between [the complainant] and the appellant
that he was not wearing a condom when he ejaculated. Even on the
appellant’s evidence, [the complainant] would not have consented to
unprotected sex. It therefore became important to determine whether
the appellant was wearing a condom that came off during the sexual
activity, or whether the appellant was never wearing one as alleged by
the Crown.111

108. Cases can be difficult to characterize where the complainant alleges that the accused refused to
wear a condom, but the accused testifies at trial that the condom accidentally fell off. See e.g. Perkins,
supra note 103; SY supra note 103.
109. Catharine Tunney, “BC Woman Says Mounties Need Better Training on Investigating CondomFree ‘Stealthing’ Assaults,” CBC News (21 June 2021), online: <cbc.ca/news/politics/rcmp-stealthingsexual-assault-1.6062324>.
110. Supra note 103.
111. Ibid at para 30.
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The Court of Appeal ultimately ordered a new trial partly on the basis that
the trial judge erred in concluding that “a virile young man” would not
lose his erection in the circumstances.112
In R v Poirier,113 the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the accused’s
conviction for the sexual assault of a 14-year-old. Because the trial
judge had a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the complainant
was above the age of consent, the analysis of the sexual assault charge
turned on whether the complainant had consented. The allegations at issue
involved deception about wearing a condom, and the trial judge treated
this deception as a lack of voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in
question. The Court of Appeal agreed:
The Appellant also admitted to lying to the complainant about wearing
a condom. Even if the complainant consented to protected sex, there
is no doubt on this record that she did not consent to unprotected sex.
Further, the evidence about anal intercourse does not suggest that the
Appellant honestly but mistakenly thought the complainant affirmatively
communicated her consent to anal intercourse at all, much less
unprotected anal intercourse.114

Here, acts of unprotected vaginal and anal intercourse were treated by the
trial judge as specific forms of sexual activity, distinct from penetration
with a condom. This analytic framing was simply accepted on appeal.
Judges in these early cases appreciated the complex individual and
collective harms caused by NCCR. In R v Changoo,115 the accused was
convicted of sexual assault after ignoring the complainant’s insistence on
a condom. In sentencing, Lane J took pains to describe how the sexual
assault culminated in an “abusive and threatening verbal barrage,”116 thus
situating this act of NCCR within the context of the accused’s aggressive
and controlling conduct towards the complainant. That this abuse happened
just after the complainant objected to the condom removal reveals the role
of power, control, and objectification often found in NCCR:
[T]the assault culminated in an abusive and threatening verbal barrage
in which Mr. Changoo told the complainant that she was “really selfish
and unfair” to him; that people “don’t say no” to him, that “because
you are new, he would let it go this time but you are never to say no to
him again,” that she was insulting to him, that “what was the difference
between a condom and not a condom,” that she was talking back to him,
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Ibid at para 35.
Supra note 103.
Ibid at para 8.
Supra note 103.
Ibid at para 3.
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“If a man talks back to him, he punches him out; I was a girl, think about
that. Women talk back to me too much now, and that was wrong,” and
that she was not “submissive enough.”117

We were unable to find a single pre-Hutchinson decision that treated
condom use as collateral to consent.
V. Post-Hutchinson decisions involving NCCR
The decisions following Hutchinson demonstrate the lack of clarity left in
the wake of that decision. Some courts have distinguished deceptions about
condoms from cases where the accused simply ignored the complainant’s
insistence on a condom, with the former going to fraud and the latter to
consent.118 Other cases have flatly ignored Hutchinson—perhaps because
of the direction it would lead them. Overall, these decisions demonstrate
the profound confusion left in the wake of the Hutchinson majority’s
finding that condom use is “collateral” to subjective consent.
The first decision on this issue after Hutchinson was R v Dadmand.119
Dadmand was one of the few cases directly involving stealthing. The
accused pretended to be a modelling agent and tricked women into
believing he would sign them to lucrative contracts if they engaged
in sexual activity with him on video.120 In one of the counts, the video
evidence clearly showed the accused engaging in stealthing:
He directs [the complainant] to assume various physical positions and
perform various sex acts. At one point S.T. says “I hope we are almost
done.” When the accused prepares to have intercourse from behind her
the second time, she says “We already did this.” She requests the accused
to put on a condom. After he does so, he removes it when he is behind
her. S.T. later observes the accused is not wearing the condom, and
comments “The condom is not even on.” S.T. puts the condom on again,
and then the accused removes it when S.T. turns her back to him.121

The accused’s NCCR was simply ignored in the reasons for judgment.
The sexual interaction within which this occurred was found to have been

117. Ibid. In the final pre-Hutchinson case, Watson, supra note 103, the case was about the validity of
a search and did not address the issue of condom refusal that arose on the facts.
118. See e.g. Kirkpatrick, supra note 10.
119. Supra note 103.
120. The trial judge rejected the argument that there was no consent because the complainants did
not know the accused’s identity, holding that after Hutchinson, identity should be narrowly defined
and only include the impersonation of a sexual partner. See ibid at paras 19, 36, 39, 79. In making this
argument, the Crown relied on R v GC, 2010 ONCA 451, a case involving a twin brother who had
impersonated the complainant’s boyfriend.
121. Dadmand, supra note 103 at para 99.
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consensual and the accused was acquitted.122 Pearlman J’s discussion of
Hutchinson earlier in the decision clearly set the stage for this finding.
He indicated that “the need for restraint and certainty has influenced the
law’s approach to consent, particularly where consent has been obtained
by deception.”123 Following Hutchinson, deception negating consent must
“carry with it the risk of serious harm.”124 Pearlman J found that the Crown
had not led any evidence to support the existence of a “significant risk”
sufficient to ground the negation of consent by fraud.125 The defendant’s
NCCR was placed beyond the scope of criminal law.
Dadmand’s restricted interpretation of the scope of consent, along with
the insistence that fraud vitiating consent requires an evidentiary foundation
(to substantiate a risk of pregnancy, STIs, or other serious bodily harms),
point towards a hesitant legal approach to NCCR. What kind of evidence
would the Crown have to lead to prove that the complainant was capable
of becoming pregnant? The profound violation of privacy involved in such
a requirement, opening the door to invasive questioning by police, Crown,
and defence regarding the complainant’s risk of physical harm, will
only deter complainants from proceeding. Responsibility for managing
the risk of NCCR becomes an individual responsibility, placed beyond
criminal legal regulation. The message is clear. Women are expected to
carefully conform to the norms of sexual safekeeping in order to avoid
being subjected to unprotected penetration against their will. Decisions
such as Hutchinson and Dadmand construct women, as Ben McJunkin
puts it, as “discriminating purchasers, both empowered and obligated to
see through a ‘seller’s puffery,’” ignoring the profound inequality often
present in sexual relationships.126
R v SY127 followed soon after Dadmand. This decision demonstrates
how the line between deceptive condom removal and condom refusal is
often blurred. The complainant in SY was the ex-girlfriend of the accused.
She testified that the accused went to her home to talk to her, refused to
leave, and blocked her exit. After several hours, she agreed to have sexual
intercourse with him to get him to leave but only if he wore a condom.128
She testified that in the middle of the intercourse he began to laugh and
asked her if she thought he was wearing a condom. When she said yes,
122. See ibid at paras 99-101.
123. Ibid at para 33.
124. Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 34, citing Cuerrier, supra note 65 at para 135 (emphasis
in original).
125. See Dadmand, supra note 103 at para 168.
126. McJunkin, supra note 31 at 32-33.
127. Supra note 103.
128. See ibid at para 4.
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he pointed to the condom lying on the bed. She was immediately upset,
stopped the sexual activity, and left the room. She testified that he later
forcibly raped her. The accused, by contrast, testified that the two of them
had consensual intercourse. He agreed that she had insisted on a condom
but indicated that it must have fallen off during intercourse, possibly when
he lost his erection.129 While the trial judge believed the accused that
the condom fell off accidentally, he did state that “[i]f S.Y. intentionally
removed the condom and then continued to have sexual intercourse with
A.C., I am satisfied that the offence of sexual assault would have been
made out.”130 The judge did not cite Hutchinson nor mention fraud.
R v Lupi131 reveals how Hutchinson requires judges to force condom
refusal into the fraud framework in order to reach a just result. The accused
and the complainant had met on an internet dating site. The accused
admitted to being aware that the complainant limited her consent to sexual
activity with a condom, testifying that the she had made it “absolutely
clear” that refusing to wear a condom would be a “deal breaker.”132 The
trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence that she heard a snapping
sound during penetrative sex with the accused after he moved behind her.133
The accused continued to have intercourse with her for a few seconds after
he removed the condom.134
The trial judge convicted the accused, distinguishing the facts from
Hutchinson because in this case there was clearly no consent to penetration
without a condom at the time of the sexual intercourse.135 The trial judge
acknowledged how NCCR undermines women’s sexual integrity and
agency, and how this in turn reinforces gender inequality: “‘Mr. Lupi’s
actions fundamentally affected Ms. V’s consent….[They] deprived her of
control over her sexual activity’ and ‘flew in the face of the Charter values
of equality and autonomy.’”136 He went on to hold that if this approach
was mistaken, then the complainant’s consent would have been vitiated
by fraud.137
On a summary conviction appeal, Justice Roberts found that the trial
judge had erred in his approach to consent, and that the circumstances
described by the complainant fell squarely within the framework set by
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See ibid at para 8.
Ibid at para 92.
Supra note 103.
Ibid at para 25.
See ibid at para 1.
See ibid.
See ibid at para 3.
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See ibid at para 3.
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the Hutchinson majority.138 He concluded that the appropriate approach
was instead to consider whether her consent was vitiated by fraud, finding
that “[t]he surreptitious removal of the condom was directly contrary to
Ms. V’s express wishes. Mr. Lupi literally did this behind her back. It was
dishonest.”139
Roberts J stressed the importance of evidence of physical harm,
describing how the complainant had engaged in lengthy courses of
prophylactic treatment that established that she experienced a clear risk
of unwanted pregnancy and STIs.140 In concluding that the accused’s
stealthing vitiated the complainant’s consent, Roberts J held:
In sum, it was readily apparent from the record that the harm here went
well-beyond “financial deprivations or mere sadness or stress from being
lied to” and extended to serious bodily harm, or the risk of serious bodily
harm, both by substantially interfering with Ms. V’s well-being, and
exposing her to the risk of an unwanted pregnancy.141

Despite Robert J’s acknowledgement of the psychological harms the
complainant suffered, he minimized the serious emotional and dignitary
harms of NCCR, constructing those feelings as “mere sadness.”142
In R v Rivera,143 the trial judge recognized that the use of a condom
was central to consent. The complainant and the accused met on an
online dating website. They exchanged messages where the complainant
indicated that “she had two rules: condoms were a must and ‘no means
no.’”144 Mr. Rivera texted back that he was “‘totally Ok with that.’”145 The
complainant testified that when she insisted on a condom after they met
in person, the accused replied that “it will be OK, I’m clean,” after which
he simply proceeded with intercourse without a condom, overriding her
clear verbal instructions.146 In shock, she testified that she froze and “[laid]
there limp.”147 The trial judge accepted the complainant’s story of what
then occurred, finding that the fact that she went to the hospital the next

138. See ibid at para 31.
139. Ibid at para 34.
140. See ibid at para 37.
141. Ibid at para 40. While Roberts J does not attribute the passage in quotations, it is taken from the
majority judgment in Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 72.
142. See ibid at para 40.
143. Supra note 103.
144. Ibid at para 5.
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid at para 7.
147. Ibid.
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day for a pregnancy test, STI tests, and a sexual assault kit supported her
credibility.148
Justice Champagne made clear that there was no voluntary agreement
to the sexual activity in question:
In my view, sex without a condom is a qualitatively different act than sex
with a condom and the complainant’s consent was withdrawn when Mr.
Rivera penetrated her without a condom without her overt agreement.
When a condom is used as a form of birth control or to prevent sexually
transmitted infections, its use provides participants with a sense of
security. The non-use of a condom against a participant’s wishes not only
usurps that [individual’s] sexual autonomy and right to make decisions
about how she/he/they engage in sexual activity, it is an activity against
that person’s will, fraught with the [gamut] of emotions resulting from
an assault.149

Perhaps recognizing that her decision was vulnerable on appeal because
of Hutchinson, Justice Champagne offered an alternate path to conviction
through fraud: “If there is any doubt that sex without a condom amounts to
sexual assault in these circumstances, I find that the complainant’s consent
was vitiated by fraud (s. 265(3) Criminal Code).”150 In this case, there was
a significant risk of bodily harm because of the increased risk of unwanted
pregnancy and STIs.151 Justice Champagne found that the accused engaged
in deception when he “[led] the complainant to believe he would wear
a condom as he had previously agreed to do so and at the last minute
he penetrated her without a condom telling her it would be ok.”152 This
analysis expands the understanding of what constitutes a deception. Here,
the failure to follow through on a prior commitment to use condoms is
squeezed into the category of fraud.153
R v Kirkpatrick154 was the first case in which a Canadian provincial
appellate court considered the implications of Hutchinson for consent
and condom use as the main issue on appeal. The majority of the Court
of Appeal for British Columbia held that condom refusal is conceptually
different from condom deception and that Hutchinson only excludes

148. See ibid at para 21.
149. Ibid at para 24.
150. Ibid at para 25.
151. See ibid at para 27.
152. Ibid.
153. Cf Landry, supra note 103 at para 6; BL, supra note 103 at para 5. In this case, the complainant
did not consent to sexual intercourse and said no, “especially not without a condom.” The accused
forced intercourse on the complainant without a condom and thus this case involved a more direct
finding of non-consent.
154. Supra note 10.
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deceptive condom removal from subjective consent. The case is currently
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, offering an opportunity for the
Court to reconsider Hutchinson as it applies to NCCR.
In Kirkpatrick, once again the complainant and the accused met on
a dating website. The complainant testified that she told the accused
that she always insists on condom use, although the accused denied this
conversation took place.155 She visited the accused at his house and the two
engaged in some consensual sexual activity. The accused then asked her to
“‘hop on’ top of him.”156 She inquired about whether he had a condom, and
he reached into the bedside table to get one.157 After they were finished,
the complainant asked to see the condom because she wanted to be sure he
had worn one.158 In the middle of the night, she awoke and noticed that the
accused was aroused. She testified that she assumed that, when Kirkpatrick
leaned towards the bedside table, he was getting another condom, and they
again had vaginal intercourse, with the accused asking her if it “felt better
this way.”159 The complainant assumed that the question was related to
the sexual position, and only realized that the accused was not wearing a
condom when he ejaculated.160 Later she confronted him by text and he
responded with “abusive” messages, one of which included a link to a
porn video entitled “‘OMG Daddy came inside me.’”161 In the aftermath,
the complainant attended the hospital and suffered serious side effects
from the prophylactic HIV treatment she underwent for 28 days.162
At his sexual assault trial, the trial judge granted a no-evidence motion
on the basis that there was no reasonable basis upon which a trier of fact
could convict.163 The complainant had agreed to the sexual activity in
question (which he defined as vaginal intercourse) and there had been
no deception, and therefore no basis for finding a fraud vitiating consent.
In concluding that the accused did not deceive the complainant, the trial
judge relied on evidence that he had asked the complainant to guide his
penis into her vagina and that he therefore did not hide the fact that he
was not wearing a condom.164 On a Crown appeal, Justice Groberman for
the majority found that protected sex is a specific form of sexual activity
155.
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157.
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160.
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that is included within the scope of the sexual activity consented to and
therefore overturned the directed verdict of acquittal and ordered a new
trial.
While all three appellate judges in Kirkpatrick would have overturned
the directed verdict of acquittal, the Court was deeply divided on the
scope of Hutchinson. For the majority, Groberman J took the position that
there was no consent to the sexual activity in question, i.e. sex without a
condom, while Justice Bennett’s concurring minority found that the only
path to conviction was through the doctrine of fraud.
The majority decision recognized that failing to see condom use
as going to consent would be “seriously out of touch with reality, and
dysfunctional in terms of its protection of sexual autonomy.”165 Groberman
J held that the Hutchinson majority was primarily concerned with how
including the “intact state of the condom” within the scope of the “sexual
activity in question” would extend the scope of voluntary agreement to
“potentially infinite collateral conditions.”166 He went on to contend that
“[n]othing in the judgment suggests that there was an intention on the part
of the majority to specifically exclude from the definition of ‘the sexual
activity in question’ physical aspects of sexual activity adopted for birth
control or disease prevention purposes.”167 In other words, the Kirkpatrick
majority decision draws a distinction between condom refusal (intercourse
without a condom) and condom deception (intercourse with a condom full
of holes) and asserts that while the latter is collateral to the consent inquiry,
the Hutchinson majority never intended to exclude the former from the
definition of “the sexual activity in question.”168 Justice Groberman also
rejected fraud as a possible path to conviction. There was nothing in the
facts to suggest that the accused intentionally deceived the complainant;
he simply refused to comply with her insistence on condom use.169 If the
majority analysis is correct, there is one pathway to conviction for condom
refusal, which negates subjective consent, and another, more onerous test
if the NCCR involves deception, which requires proof of a significant risk
of serious bodily harm.
The concurring minority opinion honed in on the Hutchinson majority’s
clear conclusion that “[e]ffective condom use is a method of contraception
and protection against sexually transmitted disease; it is not a sex act,”
indicating that it was not open to the majority to find that condom use is
165.
166.
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part of the definition of a sexual activity.170 To criminalize a sabotaged
condom differently than the refusal to wear a condom does not offer “a
‘principled and clear line’…between what is and is not part of the nature
of a sexual act.”171
Justice Bennett, following Hutchinson, treated condom use as
collateral to the “sexual activity in question” and as only relevant to the
second stage of the consent analysis, which looks at whether any factors
vitiated an otherwise valid consent.172 She held that there was sufficient
evidence to proceed to trial on the fraud issue, holding that “[t]here
was ample evidence that [the complainant] would not consent to sexual
intercourse without a condom and, on her evidence, Mr. Kirkpatrick was
well aware of this, yet he failed to disclose that he was not wearing one.”173
Justice Saunders agreed with Justice Groberman on the consent issue
but, alternatively, agreed with Justice Bennett on fraud, thus leaving the
Supreme Court of Canada with an “out” should it want to uphold the order
for a new trial without departing from Hutchinson.174
The Court of Appeal for Ontario has disregarded Kirkpatrick and
Hutchinson in two recent decisions involving condom refusal. In R
v Ma,175 the Court dealt with this issue in the context of a complainant
involved in the sex trade who always insisted on a condom. When she
refused to participate in unprotected sex with the accused, he penetrated
her regardless. The trial judge convicted the accused of sexual assault, and
the Court of Appeal agreed, citing neither Hutchinson nor Kirkpatrick:
In our view, the appellant’s refusal to use a condom and his subsequent use

of a boxcutter to stroke the neck of the second complainant as he kissed
her entitled the trial judge to conclude that sexual activity that started as
consensual evolved later into a non-consensual sexual assault.176

Similarly, in R v IAD,177 a case involving mistaken belief in consent,
the Court treated the complainant’s insistence on condom use as being an
integral part of the sexual activity in question and therefore essential to the
analysis of the mistaken belief in consent defence:
170. Ibid at para 47 (emphasis in original), citing Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 64.
171. Kirkpatrick, supra note 10 at para 104, citing Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4 at para 49.
172. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 10 at para 91.
173. Ibid at para 115.
174. A few months after Kirkpatrick, the same Court dealt with a case where an accused ignored the
complainant’s insistence on a condom in Tso, supra note 103. Neither Kirkpatrick nor Hutchinson was
cited, and the conviction appeal was dismissed without discussing this issue.
175. Supra note 103.
176. Ibid at para 10.
177. Supra note 103.
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We agree with the appellant that this case required a clear inquiry into the
reasonable steps potentially taken by the respondent. This is particularly
true given both the complainant and respondent’s clear evidence that she
asked for a condom, yet the sexual intercourse ensued without one. Even
taking the respondent’s evidence at its highest, this is a circumstance that
was known to him at the time that the intercourse commenced, yet he did
not inquire of the complainant whether she wished to proceed without a
condom.178

At least one court has relied on Kirkpatrick as a persuasive authority
that protects a complainant’s right to limit her voluntary agreement to
intercourse with a condom. R v Kraft179 involved a summary conviction
appeal of an acquittal in a case involving condom refusal. The complainant
and the accused engaged in consensual foreplay but, in the absence of any
discussion, the accused penetrated the complainant without telling her he
was going to do so. The complainant immediately informed the accused
that he had to put a condom on.180 At issue on appeal was the trial judge’s
treatment of this single act of unprotected intercourse, both with respect to
consent and mistaken belief in consent.
The trial judge had imposed the Hutchinson fraud formula, holding
that condoms are not sex acts, that the complainant had consented to the
intercourse, and that, because there was no deception, there was nothing
to negate her voluntary agreement. In rejecting this approach, Justice
Williams cited Kirkpatrick for the proposition that “condom use is highly
relevant to the consent analysis: no condom, no consent.”181 Williams J
agreed that sex without a condom is a specific form of sexual activity.
Because the accused had taken no steps to clarify the complainant’s
consent, he was not entitled to claim that he mistakenly believed that the
complainant was consenting to sex without a condom.
It is abundantly evident from these recent decisions that Hutchinson
has created a lack of clarity about whether condom use is part of what is
178. Ibid at para 15. The complainant was a vulnerable 15-year-old who had recently left home
and was couch-surfing. The accused was an 18-year-old from whom the complainant sometimes
bought cannabis. One night, they ended up sleeping in the basement of an acquaintance’s home. The
complainant testified that she moved to sleep on the couch with the accused because she was cold.
When they started to cuddle, the accused began to pull down her pants and digitally penetrate her.
She attempted to get off the couch, but the accused pulled her back. She testified that he started to
penetrate her and that she said “no.” When she realized he wasn’t going to stop, she said, “we should
put a condom on,” and the accused replied that she was being “childish,” and continued to have
unprotected intercourse until he withdrew and ejaculated on and around her vagina. The trial judge
found no consent but acquitted on the basis of a reasonable doubt about the defence of mistaken belief
in consent. See ibid at paras 5-8, 17.
179. Supra note 103.
180. See ibid at para 12.
181. Ibid at para 49.
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consented to. We have seen judges try to expand the notion of deception
in order to fit into the narrow constraints of Hutchinson, and we have seen
judges disregard Hutchinson altogether. The Supreme Court has a unique
opportunity in Kirkpatrick to retreat from the confusing and unprincipled
logic of Hutchinson, and we hope it rises to the occasion.
VI. Legislative options
Relying on doctrinal developments to provide clarity can be risky for
feminists. Supreme Court decisions may turn on complicated points of
law and, as we saw in Hutchinson and GF, on concerns about how those
developments impact other areas of law not before the Court. As was
demonstrated in the oral hearing of Kirkpatrick, some justices appear to be
reluctant to reconsider a decision as recent as Hutchinson, notwithstanding
the legal confusion left in its wake. If the Court declines to retreat from
Hutchinson, law reform will be necessary to address the widespread and
pervasive phenomenon of NCCR.
Cross-nationally, there have been several efforts to secure legal
remedies for NCCR both through civil and criminal law reforms.182 As we
have argued here, NCCR constitutes sexual assault because the survivor
has not voluntarily agreed to penetrative sex without a condom. While
civil actions for NCCR could be empowering for survivors, offering
them control over the process and the possibility of compensation for the
harms suffered, civil remedies are slow and costly, and they are therefore
inaccessible to many complainants. Nor does an individualized civil
remedy have the same expressive function as criminal law. As Chesser
and Zahra have argued, “[i]f the sexual wrong of stealthing was rectified
by a civil remedy, society may perceive stealthing as a wrong less severe
than other sexual offences shielded by the criminal law.”183 For this reason,
many jurisdictions are contemplating criminal law reform to designate
NCCR as a form of sexual assault.
Criminal law reforms in other jurisdictions have paralleled the
divergent approaches taken by the majority and concurring opinions in
Hutchinson. In 2019, Singapore became the first country to pass a criminal
law amendment to respond to stealthing.184 Using a fraud formulation
182. The California legislature recently passed a bill that would allow survivors of NCCR to seek
civil damages from perpetrators: US, AB 453, An act to amend Section 1708.5 of the Civil Code,
relating to civil law, 2021–2022, Reg Sess, Cal, 2021. This bill followed an earlier and ultimately
unsuccessful effort to criminalize stealthing as a form of sexual assault. See also McKenney Cornett,
“Taking the Lead: A Strategic Analysis of Stealthing and the Best Route for Potential Civil Plaintiffs
to Recover” (2021) 27:3 Wm & Mary J Race, Gender, & Soc Justice 931.
183. Chesser & Zahra, supra note 40 at 229.
184. See Criminal Law Reform Act 2019 (No 15 of 2019, Sing), s 376H.
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that shares most of the weaknesses of the Hutchinson majority position,
the Singapore Penal Code now criminalizes misrepresentation about
“sexually protective measures” as its own offence: “procurement of sexual
activity by deception.” Similarly, the Legislature of Australian Capital
Territory recently amended the Crimes Act to include the “intentional
misrepresentation by the other person about the use of a condom” as fraud
negating consent.185
In contrast to law reforms that restrict criminalization to deceptive
forms of condom removal, a New York bill passed but still pending in
committee would criminalize the “unconsented to removal or tampering
with a sexually protective device” as a form of sexual battery.186 While
encompassing both deceptive and overt forms of non-consensual
condom removal, the broad definition of “sexually protective devices”
creates the potential for women to be criminalized when they interfere
with contraceptive devices such as oral or injectable contraceptives and
intrauterine devices. This approach fails to recognize that these types of
deceptions do not relate to “the how” of the sexual activity and ignores
how the experience of NCCR and the risk of unwanted pregnancy
represent specific forms of gendered harm.187 This is one reason the
Hutchinson minority limited its judgment to the how of sexual activity,
explicitly not extending its reach to the consequences of sexual activity.
Perhaps the clearest proposal for law reform, and one that best captures
how NCCR violates sexual integrity and gender equality, has recently
been proposed by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission. Within
a set of recommendations aimed at simplifying and strengthening the law
of sexual consent, the Commission proposes an amendment to the Crimes
Act that would provide that “a person who consents to a particular sexual
activity is not, by reason only of that fact, to be taken to consent to another
sexual activity,” stating that “a person who consents to sexual activity
using a condom is not to be taken, by reason only of that fact, to consent to
sexual activity without using a condom.”188 This amendment thus clearly
defines sex with a condom as a specific form of sexual activity within the
185. Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), 2021 134, s 67(1)(h).
186. US, SB S4401, Relates to Unconsented Removal or Tampering with a Sexually Protective Device,
2019–2020, Reg Sess, NY, 2019 (“sexually protective device” includes “a male or female condom,
spermicide, diaphragm, cervical, contraceptive sponge, dental dam or another physical device”).
187. We recognize that in the rare event that a woman tampered with a condom, she would be
impacting how the sexual activity is carried out and could potentially be subject to criminalization
under this approach.
188. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Consent in Relation to Sexual Offences, Report
148 (September 2020) at 66, online (pdf): <lawreform.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/
Reports/Report%20148.pdf>.
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scope of the consent inquiry. The government has committed to legislating
these proposed changes, making NSW the first jurisdiction to explicitly
recognize the right to limit consent to protected sex.189
The Canadian Parliament could accomplish the same result by
amending section 273.1 of the Criminal Code to clarify that whether a
condom is used is part of “the sexual activity in question” to which one
must voluntarily agree. A simple definition of “sexual activity in question”
could make clear that the complainant must consent to each sexual activity,
as well as to how it is performed, including whether a condom is used.
Conclusion
Concern about NCCR has been constructed as a hysterical moral panic
that is complicit in the regressive politics of the carceral state. To the
contrary, NCCR needs to be understood as a widespread form of genderbased violence. As long as we criminalize sexual assault as a violation
of sexual autonomy, NCCR must be understood as negating subjective
consent. It is a form of sexual touching that the complainant does not want
to take place. While violative condom practices can subject survivors
to the risks of unwanted pregnancies and STIs, these acts also produce
complex forms of harm, undermine survivors’ sexual agency and dignity,
and reinforce a form of masculinity defined by sexual conquest, premised
on the objectification of women, and antithetical to any concept of sexual
equality. Whether the criminal law recognizes a person’s autonomy to
choose whether or not to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse should
not depend on whether they are capable of becoming pregnant or whether
the partner has an STI. How the sexual activity is undertaken must be part
of the consent inquiry.
The Canadian cases discussed in this paper illustrate how NCCR
interacts with patterns of abuse and degradation, whether enacted as a form
of reproductive coercion within a relationship characterized by coercive
control, performed within a more elaborate scheme of sexual deception,
or perpetrated by men in the context of casual sexual encounters. The case
law reveals that NCCR is sometimes followed up by abusive tirades, texts,
and unsolicited stealthing porn. It is precisely the manipulation, deception,
and transgression of boundaries that are eroticized by NCCR.
The analytical framework established by Hutchinson draws a number
of untenable distinctions that work to insulate some forms of NCCR from

189. NSW Government, “Proposed Reform of Sexual Consent Laws: Information About Proposed
Changes to Consent Laws Announced by the NSW Government” (2021), online: <www.dcj.nsw.gov.
au/justice/proposed-reform-of-sexual-consent-laws>.
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criminal sanction. Even though the definition of consent in Canadian law
is supposed to be subjective, by defining condom use as collateral to the
consent inquiry, Hutchinson paternalistically informs survivors that they
subjectively consented to acts that they did not agree to and may have
experienced as deeply violating. The test for sexual fraud directs attention
only to practices that are deceptive and that risk serious bodily harm, thus
minimizing violations of women’s sexual agency and dignity, which can
be dismissed as “mere sadness.”190 It is noteworthy that in several of these
prosecutions, judges referred to the fact that complainants behaved as
responsible risk managers, who carefully surveilled their sexual partners’
condom use and immediately sought testing and prophylaxis when their
vigilance failed. Conversely, however, as the treatment of NCCR in
Dadmand suggests, a complainant who fails to approximate the normative
standard of the risk-managing good victim may be denied legal protection.
Establishing a complainant’s status as a good victim according to this
overemphasis on physical harm requires that the complainant be willing to
have confidential medical information disclosed in court. Postmenopausal,
pregnant, infertile, or trans women, as well as men who insist on condom
use when having sex with men, are simply out of luck unless their sexual
partner had an STI.
Ultimately, the Hutchinson formula creates a number of unprincipled
distinctions between those situations of NCCR subject to legal regulation
and those relegated to the realm of ethical and moral harms. Why should
there be legal distinctions drawn between deceptive forms of NCCR
and those that are carried out blatantly, when the difference between the
two circumstances can turn on factors that should be insignificant to the
definition of sexual assault? This may amount to drawing a legal distinction
based on the mere seconds before the complainant discovers that her
insistence on protected sex has been violated, or on whether the accused
was in front or behind her when he penetrated her without a condom.
Judges appear to be resisting the Hutchinson framework precisely
because the result conflicts with their common sense understanding of
what consent means. The Court of Appeal majority opinion in Kirkpatrick
could be characterized as a deliberate misreading of Hutchinson and an
invitation for the Supreme Court to revisit the conclusion that condom use
is collateral to the sexual activity in question. Whether or not the Court
takes up this invitation, feminist legal scholars committed to substantive

190. Lupi, supra note 103 at para 40, citing the majority judgment in Hutchinson SCC, supra note 4
at para 72.
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equality must rise to the challenge of forging a principled basis for defining
the scope of consent to sexual activity.
Where a complainant insists on condom use, it is surely not unduly
onerous to require a man to either use a condom or refrain from sexual
intercourse. To argue that a woman who consents to vaginal intercourse
only with a condom is giving subjective consent to any vaginal intercourse
without a condom resurrects the much-discredited notion of implied
consent—that agreement in one context implies agreement in a completely
different context. The majority position in Hutchinson is quite simply a
form of implied consent—a doctrine explicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Ewanchuk.
While we strongly support the conclusion of the Kirkpatrick majority
that disregard of the complainant’s insistence on condom use negates
subjective consent, it is inconsistent with the troubling conclusion from
Hutchinson that consent to sex with a condom implies subjective consent
to sex without a condom unless vitiated by fraud. Extending fraud, as the
minority does in Kirkpatrick, to cases where there is no clear evidence
of deception is not the solution, nor is making an artificial distinction
between deceptions and overt disregard of the complainant’s wishes on
condom use. It is essential to rethink the definition of “the sexual activity
in question” with respect to condom use and how the sexual activity is
carried out.
The Supreme Court of Canada has a unique opportunity in Kirkpatrick
to rethink a decision made by only four justices of that Court that has left
the law “seriously out of touch with reality, and dysfunctional in terms of
its protection of sexual autonomy.”191 The Court can make this adjustment
without upending the meaning of voluntary agreement and the structure of
subjective consent set out in GF. The Court need only acknowledge that
“the sexual activity in question” includes whether a condom is used. We
urge the Court to allow Canadians to determine for themselves whether
or not they are willing to consent to sex without a condom. If the Court
fails to rise to the occasion, Parliament should intervene and amend the
definition of consent in section 273.1 by including condom use and how
sexual activity is carried out as being within the scope of the sexual activity
that must be consented to.

191. Kirkpatrick, supra note 10 at para 3.

38 The Dalhousie Law Journal

